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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature Of The Case 
Michael Alan McCall appeals from 
after an evidentiary hearing. 
denial of his post-conviction petition 
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings 
McCall petitioned for post-conviction relief from his conviction for 
possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. (R., p. 5.) All claims 
asserted in the petition, save a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel for 
failing to file a motion to suppress, were summarily dismissed by the district 
court. (R., pp. 214-25.) 
At the evidentiary hearing Officer Stephenson testified that he conducted a 
traffic stop of McCall for failing to signal as he merged into traffic from the side of 
the road. (Tr., p. 46, Ls. 3-24.1) McCall and one other witness, Timothy Jones, 
testified that McCall properly signaled before entering traffic from the side of the 
road in front of Jones' house. (Tr., p. 8, L. 19 - p. 9, L. 1; p. 27, Ls. 9-11.) 
Jones's house is on the 600 block of Second Avenue East. (Tr., p. 6, Ls. 2-5.) 
The location the officer saw Jones pull away from was on the 500 block of 
Second Avenue East. (Tr., p. 13, Ls. 11-16; p. 46, Ls. 3-24.2) 
1 All "Tr." citations are to the transcript of the September 12, 2011 evidentiary 
hearing. 
2 The district court took judicial notice of the transcript of the underlying criminal 
trial. (R., p. 264.) The court then relied on this transcript, specifically quoting it, 
for the proposition that McCall was stopped for pulling into traffic with signaling 
on the five-hundred block of Second Avenue East. (R., pp. 269-70.) Because 
McCall has not included the transcript of the criminal trial in the record on this 
appeal (R., p. 295), this factual finding is not subject to challenge on appeal. 
1 
McCall testified that he demanded his attorney file a suppression motion 
on the ground that he was not ultimately issued a citation for the illegal merger. 
(Tr., p. 33, Ls. 7-16.) Jones testified that neither McCall nor his attorneys in the 
criminal case contacted him about what he knew about the traffic stop, and he 
never talked to anyone about the incident until contacted in relation to the post-
conviction action. (Tr., p. 19, Ls. 8-11; p. 20, Ls. 8-11; p. 24, Ls. 9-13.) McCall's 
criminal trial attorneys confirmed that McCall never told them that Jones had 
information about the circumstances of the traffic stop. (Tr., p. 72, Ls. 3-17; p. 
83, Ls. 3-7; but see Tr., p. 83, L. 8 - p. 84, L. 4 (did discuss "landlord" who may 
have been Jones and may have seen the "incident" with someone else in public 
defender's office).) McCall's criminal trial attorneys testified that they reviewed 
the police reports and concluded a motion to suppress would be fruitless based 
on the officer's report that he saw McCall merge into traffic without signaling. 
(Tr., p. 73, L. 6 - p. 74, L. 5; p. 76, Ls. 1-12; p. 82, L. 15 - p. 83, L. 2; p. 85, Ls. 
9-20.) 
After the evidentiary hearing, the district court denied relief on the 
remaining claim and dismissed the petition with prejudice. (R., pp. 255-74.) The 
district court concluded that the "crux" of McCall's claim was that he used his turn 
signal when he "pulled away from the residence of Mr. Jones in the 600 block" of 
the street. (R., p. 269.) Although Jones did so testify, the officer testified McCall 
had pulled out from a drug house on the 500 block, which was corroborated by a 
State v. Mowrey, 128 Idaho 804, 805, 919 P.2d 333, 334 (1996) (missing 
portions of record presumed to support decision of trial court). 
2 
prior statement McCall himself. (R., pp. 269-70.) Jones also testified that 
he did not know if McCall might have made an additional stop one block away 
before being pulled over. , p. 269.) The district court concluded that because 
there was "no evidence of any suppressible issues" there was no objective 
shortcoming in electing to not file a motion to suppress. (R., p. 270.) Likewise, 
McCall failed to "show that the motion to suppress would likely have been 
granted" and therefore "has not shown prejudice." (R., p. 271.) 
McCall filed a notice of appeal timely from the denial of his petition. (R., 
pp. 278-80.) 
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ISSUE 
McCall states the issue on appeal as: 
Whether the district court erred when it denied post 
conviction relief after an evidentiary hearing, rejecting Petitioner's 
assertions that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel? 
(Appellant's brief, p. 3.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
On Appeal McCall asserts that the district court applied an incorrect 
Fourth Amendment standard to his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. In 
fact the district court denied his claim because evidence that McCall signaled 
while pulling into traffic on the 600 block was irrelevant to whether he pulled into 
traffic without signaling on the 500 block as observed by the officer. Has McCall 
failed to demonstrate that the district court erroneously found he failed to prove 
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to suppress? 
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ARGUMENT 
McCall Has Failed To Demonstrate That The District Court Erroneously Found 
He Failed To Prove That His Counsel Was Ineffective For Failing To File A 
Motion To Suppress 
A introduction 
The district court concluded that McCall failed to prove either prong of his 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. (R, pp. 264-71.) On appeal McCall 
claims "the court found merely that the police officer believed that Mr. McCall 
failed to use his turn signal" and therefore decided the case solely on the officer's 
"subjective good faith." (Appellant's brief, p. 15.) McCall asserts his whole claim 
comes down to "whether the turn signal was used or not" and the court's alleged 
failure to make that determination requires a remand. (Appellant's brief, pp. 15-
17.) McCall's claim that the district court decided this case solely upon 
"subjective good faith" is not supported by the record. To the contrary, the record 
establishes that the district court found McCall's evidence of signaling while 
pulling into traffic on the 600 block of Second Avenue East was irrelevant to any 
suppression motion challenging the officer's decision to stop McCall for a 
different traffic infraction (pulling into traffic without signaling on the 500 block of 
Second Avenue East). McCall has therefore failed to show error by the district 
court. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When the district court conducts an evidentiary hearing and enters 
findings of fact and conclusions of law, an appellate court will disturb the findings 
fact only if they are clearly erroneous, but will freely review the conclusions of 
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law drawn by the district court from those facts. Mitchell v. State, 132 Idaho 274, 
276-77, 971 P.2d 727, 729-730 (1998). The credibility of the witnesses, the 
weight to be given to their testimony, and the inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence are all matters solely within the province of the district court. Peterson 
v. State, 139 Idaho 95, 97, 73 P.3d 108, 110 (Ct. App. 2003). A trial court's 
decision that a post-conviction petitioner has not met his burden of proof is 
entitled to great weight Sanders v. State, 117 Idaho 939, 940, 792 P.2d 964, 
965 (Ct. App. 1990). 
C. McCall's Argument That The Court Denied His Claim Of Ineffective 
Assistance Of Counsel For Failing To File A Suppression Motion Because 
Of The Officer's Good Faith Belief Is Belied By The Record 
A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief has the burden of proving, by a 
preponderance of the evidence, the allegations upon which his claim is based. 
Estes v. State, 111 Idaho 430,436,725 P.2d 135,141 (1986); Clark v. State, 92 
Idaho 827, 830, 452 P.2d 54, 57 (1969); I.C.R. 57(c). A petitioner seeking relief 
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel must prove "that his counsel was 
deficient in his performance and that this deficiency resulted in prejudice." 
Murray v. State, 121 Idaho 918,922,828 P.2d 1323, 1327 (Ct. App. 1992) (citing 
State v. Bingham, 116 Idaho 415, 776 P.2d 424 (1989)). 
"To establish deficient assistance, the burden is on the petitioner to show 
that his attorney's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 
This objective standard embraces a strong presumption that trial counsel was 
competent and diligent." Baldwin v. State, 145 Idaho 148, 153-54, 177 P.3d 362, 
367-68 (2008) (internal citations omitted). To meet this burden "requires showing 
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that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 
'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). "[S]trategic or tactical decisions will not 
be second-guessed on appeal uniess those decisions are based on inadequate 
preparation, ignorance of relevant law, or other shortcomings capable of 
objective evaluation." Baldwin, 145 Idaho at 153-54, 177 P.3d at 367-68. 
To establish prejudice, a defendant must prove a reasonable probability 
that, but for counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the proceeding 
would have been different. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 761, 760 P.2d 1174, 
1177 (1988); Cowger v. State, 132 Idaho 681,685,978 P.2d 241,244 (Ct. App. 
1999). Where, as here, the allegedly deficient performance was failure to file a 
suppression motion, the petitioner has failed to prove prejudice if the motion 
would not have been granted. Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 158, 857 P.2d 634, 
637 (Ct. App. 1993); Davis v. State, 116 Idaho 401, 407, 775 P.2d 1243, 1249 
(Ct. App. 1989). 
Here the district court concluded that McCall presented no evidence that a 
motion to suppress challenging reasonable suspicion for the traffic stop would 
have been granted, because all of McCall's evidence related to him signaling 
when he left the curb from his landlord's house on the 600 block of the street, but 
the traffic stop occurred when he left the curb at a different location-a drug 
house on the 500 block of the street. (R, pp. 269-70.) The court rejected 
McCall's testimony that he made no stops after leaving the house on the 600 
block based on McCall's prior statement that he was stopped after "'pulling away 
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from the curb in the 500 Block of Second Avenue East."' (R., p. 269.) The 
court's finding that evidence of turn signal use on the 600 block was irrelevant to 
the question of whether the officer had reasonable suspicion based on failure to 
use the turn signal when pulling into traffic from a location on the 500 block was 
supported by the evidence and determinative of whether counsel was ineffective 
for failing to move to suppress on the basis of that evidence. 
In addition, the trial court specifically found that McCall failed to prove "that 
trial counsel, by a preponderance of the evidence, did not meet the objective 
standards of competence." (R., p. 270.) Indeed, there was no evidence 
presented that, in making the tactical decision to not bring a suppression motion, 
trial counsel failed to review the evidence available, did not understand the 
applicable legal standards, or decided not to file the motion because of any other 
objective shortcoming. (See Tr., p. 71, L. 13 - p. 88, L. 17.) McCall did not even 
present evidence that he, at any relevant time, told his counsel that he was 
claiming he had in fact signaled and had a witness to support that claim. (Tr., p. 
32, L. 10 - p. 34, L. 18; p. 42, L. 1 - p. 43, L. 18.) Likewise, the district court 
found that both trial counsel had concluded there were not "suppressible issues," 
that after reviewing the evidence presented in post-conviction the "court would 
have to agree," and that McCall had not shown that the motion to suppress would 
likely have been granted. (R., p. 271.) 
McCall argues that the district court merely concluded that the officer had 
a "subjective good faith" belief that McCall had not used his turn signal, then 
argues the court erred by not determining if he in fact used his turn signal. 
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(Appellant's brief, pp. 15-23.) No fair reading of the court's written opinion 
supports this argument. The district court clearly found that McCall's evidence of 
turn signal use was not relevant to the question of reasonable suspicion for the 
stop because it related to a different traffic maneuver, not because the actual 
facts leading to the stop did not matter. (R., pp. 269-70.) 
In addition, McCall's argument ignores the fact that the issue was not 
suppression per se but was instead ineffective assistance of counsel. At no 
point, for example, does McCall even address the district court's finding that 
there was no objective shortcoming in counsel's tactical decision to not pursue a 
suppression motion. (Compare R., p. 270 with Appellant's brief.) 
McCall has failed to show error by the district court. Taking a few lines of 
the district court's written opinion out of context, McCall attempts to characterize 
the district court's decision as merely accepting the good faith of the police 
officer. This characterization is inaccurate. Instead, the court held that the 
evidence McCall sought to use to challenge his stop did not relate to the events 
giving rise to reasonable suspicion for that stop. In addition, McCall does not 
challenge the district court's determination that he failed to prove any objective 
shortcoming by counsel or prejudice. For these reasons McCall has failed to 
show error. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the district 
determination that McCall failed to prove ineffective assistance of 
tactical choice to not file a motion to suppress to challenge the basis for the 
stop. 
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2012. 
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